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Abstract 
The main topic of this research project are the beliefs of American foreign policy decision-
makers and their impact on foreign policy output. In order to study this subject, the following 
research question was used: ‘What aspects of foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs 
influence foreign policy output?’. Furthermore, the aim of this study was to provide insight in 
whether American foreign policy decision-makers rely more on their normative beliefs or 
practical beliefs on the public opinion.  It was tried to find evidence for the proposition that 
practical beliefs on the public opinion are becoming more influential in foreign policy 
decision-making. The theoretical framework utilized was the distinction between normative 
beliefs, which are to be defined the ideological beliefs of the foreign policy decision-makers, 
and practical beliefs on the public opinion, described as the beliefs about the usefulness of the 
public opinion. A discourse analysis was chosen as an appropriate research method for this 
research project. In order to conduct the discourse analysis, American foreign policy decision-
makers in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council between 11 September 
2001 and 12 September 2002 were selected as a case to be studied. The speeches that were 
performed by the American foreign policy decision-makers in the United Nations were 
selected to be the data for the discourse analysis. The results of the discourse analysis 
revealed that the normative beliefs of American foreign policy decision-makers came forward 
throughout the entire year, whereas practical beliefs on the public opinion only came forward 
after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It is therefore concluded that foreign policy 
decision-makers’ normative beliefs are still more influential on foreign policy output.   
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Introduction 
On Tuesday 11 September 2001, the United States of America faced the biggest attack within 
their own borders since Pearl Harbor. Days after the attack, President George W. Bush and his 
foreign policy decision-makers had to come up with a response to show the world that a 
terrorist attack was not tolerated (Bush, 2010, p.137). In the White House, President Bush 
made clear that in their response they had to rely on their own beliefs, instead of focusing on 
the public opinion. He stated that “the public would eventually move on. As elected leaders, 
we had a responsibility to stay focused on the threat and fight the war until we had prevailed” 
(Bush, 2010, p.151). This statement indicates how President Bush thought about using the 
public opinion in a crisis situation. Staying focused on a specific goal, even though the public 
would eventually move on, had to be the task of the elected decision-makers (Bush, 2010, 
p.151). According to President Bush’s thoughts, decision-makers were to rely on their own 
beliefs when policy was made. Mood swings of the public were seen as negative and in the 
disinterest of the nation out large. Therefore, President Bush argued that decision-makers 
need to keep relying on their own beliefs. However, this is just the opinion of one American 
decision-maker.  
 Therefore, it is puzzling to look at what aspects of American foreign policy decision-
makers’ beliefs have more influence on foreign policy in general. Do foreign policy decision-
makers rely more on their own knowledge and ideological beliefs, just like President Bush 
stated? Or do they rely on their beliefs about the usefulness of the public opinion, when they 
make decisions about foreign policy? Hence, the aim of this study is to provide an answer to 
the following question, what aspects of foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs influence 
foreign policy output? The academic relevance of this study is that it gives insight in the 
normative beliefs and beliefs on the public opinion of American foreign policy decision-
makers in crisis situations. In this research project, it is tried to find evidence for the next 
proposition: practical beliefs on the public opinion are becoming more influential on foreign 
policy. In order to find evidence for this proposition, a case study has been conducted. 
Speeches from American foreign policy decision-makers in the United Nations between 12 
September 2001 and 11 September 2002 have been studied. In this study, American foreign 
policy decision-makers are considered to be the President, Secretary of State, United States 
(Deputy) Ambassador to the United Nations, and high foreign policy officials that represent 
the United States at the United Nations.  
4 
 
 This study will be organized as follows. First, a brief overview of the literature 
concerning belief systems, normative and ideological beliefs, and beliefs on the public 
opinion will be provided, together with a proposition. Secondly, a theoretical framework will 
be presented. Indicators for normative and practical beliefs on the public opinion will be 
derived from the existing literature. Thirdly, the methodology, together with information 
about the case and data selection, will be discussed. Fourthly, a discourse analysis is 
conducted in order to find evidence for the proposition that came forward in the literature 
review. After a scheme presents all the important statements from the foreign policy decision-
maker’s speeches, the results will be discussed. Lastly, a conclusion and discussion will be 
started.  
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Literature Review 
Many scholars have written about the beliefs of policy decision-makers, and specifically 
foreign policy decision-makers. First, attention will be paid towards the literature about 
general belief systems of policy decision-makers. Then, a closer look will be taken at the 
written work at the ideological beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers. Lastly, literature on 
foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs on the public opinion will be studied.  
 
Belief Systems 
In order to identify what aspects of foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs have a greater 
impact on foreign policy output, it is necessary to look at how belief systems of policy makers 
are built in general. When it becomes clear how belief systems are built in general, it will be 
easier to identify its characteristics, like ideological beliefs and beliefs on the public opinion, 
that are part of general belief systems.  
 Many political scientists have done research on the subject of the political elite belief 
systems. Scholars have found out that belief systems are built up by multiple features. 
Sabatier and Hunter (1988, p.229) listed the aspects that build belief systems. Orientations 
about “the nature of man and social conflict”, or in other words cognitive orientations, are one 
of these aspects (Sabatier & Hunter, 1988, p.229). Together with interpersonal orientations, 
normative orientations and political partnerships, which are often related to traditional right-
left cleavages, are part of belief systems (Sabatier & Hunter, 1988, p.229). Sartori (1969, 
p.400) stated that ideologies and left-right cleavages are narrower concepts of belief systems. 
Sabatier and Hunter (1988, p.231) argued that another aspect is an important part of political 
elite belief systems: causal perceptions. Perceptions about the effects of certain actions, which 
are the result of lifelong learning and formed in childhood and early adulthood, are a critical 
aspect of belief systems (Sabatier & Hunter, 1988, p.231). Tetlock (1984, p.365) already came 
up with a similar statement four years earlier, when he wrote about how conservative beliefs 
were developed in the early childhood. Opinions about developments in societies, possible 
solutions and its effects were shaped by how people were raised in their childhood and early 
adulthood (Tetlock, 1984, p.365). Thus, the way decision-makers behave individually and 
make decisions in difficult situations, depends on the way they perceive their “physical and 
social environment” (Holsti, 2015, p.19). In order to understand the complex physical and 
social environment, simplified belief systems are formed (Holsti, 2015, p.19). Sartori (1969, 
p.405) developed a model for the simplified belief systems of decision-makers, which is in 
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line with the distinction between normative beliefs and beliefs on the public opinion that is 
made in this research project. If Sartori (1969, p.405) were to be followeds, the cognitive 
status and emotional status of a decision-maker leads to a certain belief system. The cognitive 
status of a decision-maker can be closed or open, which relates to whether the decision-
maker’s beliefs can be influenced by arguments or evidence (Sartori, 1969, p.404). According 
to Sartori (1969, p.404), the emotional status of a decision-maker can be strong or weak. 
These two facets of belief systems, the cognitive and emotional status, lead to the construction 
of a belief system. Sartori argued that if the cognitive status of the decision-maker is closed 
and the emotional status strong, the belief system of a decision-maker relies more on ideology 
(Sartori, 1969, p.405). This is contrasted when the decision-maker has a more open cognitive 
status and a weak emotional status, which leads to a belief system that relies more on 
pragmatism (Sartori, 1969, p.405). In the following sections, a closer look will be taken on the 
normative beliefs of decision-makers, and how the pragmatist aspect of belief systems results 
in the beliefs on the public opinion. 
 
Normative Beliefs 
Herbert Kritzer (1978, p.485) once defined ideology as “a system of beliefs centered upon a 
small number of central principles”. The behavior of an individual usually follows the central 
principles, especially if these principles are highly structured (Kritzer, 1978, p.486). Many 
scholars have conducted research on the structure of beliefs among American foreign policy 
decision-makers. Certain aspects of the structure of belief systems and ideologies came 
forward. Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983, p.308) used the distinction between cooperative and 
militant internationalism in their study to compare mass and elite foreign policy beliefs. 
Whereas cooperative internationalism is more focused on multilateral foreign policy plans, 
militant internationalism relies more on unilateral and military orientated foreign policy 
orientations (Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983, p.308). In an attempt to compare mass and elite 
belief systems, they ended up with this particular distinction, because there were no clear 
differences between the two groups in other issue areas (Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983, p.308). 
Holsti and Rosenau (1990, p.96) used the same distinction to structure foreign policy attitudes 
among American political leaders, but they recognized other important issue areas that formed 
the distinction between cooperative and militant internationalism. Military-antimilitary, 
interventionist-isolationist, and unilateralist-multilateralism attitudes all structured the belief 
systems of foreign policy decision-makers (Holsti & Rosenau, 1990, p.96). These attitudes 
were also build off different issues. Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983, p.311) argued that 
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cooperative and militant internationalism were build off issues about American strength in the 
world, foreign economic and military aid, and whether international cooperation should 
mainly serve American foreign policy goals. When Koopman et al. (1998, p.40-42) did 
research on the differences between beliefs of Russian and American political elites, 
economic liberalization was considered as one of the main issues that foreign policy beliefs 
were build off. Holsti and Rosenau (1990, p.99) argued that beliefs about undermining 
national sovereignty to serve national or international goals was one of the main features of 
militant internationalism. According to Holsti and Rosenau (1990, p.101), the main features 
of cooperative internationalism were thoughts about cooperation in the United Nations, 
fighting poverty around the world by giving economic aid and providing assistance. In a study 
on the role of enemy images and ideology in elite belief systems, Murray and Cowden (1999, 
p.476) have also identified certain facets that characterize cooperative and militant 
internationalism. Whereas militant internationalism was measured by asking questions about 
using the military to reach economic goals and undermining national sovereignty, cooperative 
internationalism was measured by asking questions about foreign economic aid, fighting 
poverty, and protecting human rights and democracy (Murray & Cowden, 1999, p.476). 
Hence, Holsti and Rosenau (1990, p.94) concluded that ideology and party connections play a 
large role in the belief systems of foreign policy decision-makers.  
         
Beliefs on the Public Opinion  
In this section, a closer look will be taken at the literature about foreign policy decision-
makers’ beliefs on the public opinion. It is believed that attitudes of decision-makers have 
influence on policies (Jervis, 1976, p.28). However, there are different views on how attitudes 
towards the public opinion can be described. Secretary of State’s special assistant Adam 
Yarmolinsky (1967, p.543) did not have a positive view on the public opinion. Yarmolinsky 
has addressed several constraints which prevented the public opinion from being taken 
seriously. Like Walter Lippmann (1922, p.258) once argued, Yarmolinsky implied that the 
political reality is too difficult to grasp for ordinary citizens. The field of foreign policy is too 
multi-faceted and complex for the general public to have a well- and thoroughly informed 
opinion about (Yarmolinsky, 1967, p.544). Furthermore, the public is always biased about 
certain topics, which leads the public to desire specific policies for their preferred outcomes 
(Yarmolinsky, 1967, p.544). Therefore, the government officials have to resist the pressure of 
the public opinion and aim to approach problems in an objective way (Yarmolinsky, 1967, 
p.544). Bernard Cohen interviewed multiple State Department officials in the 1970s and he 
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found similar responses about the public opinion. Once, a State Department official who was 
interviewed by Cohen (1973, p.62) said “To hell with the public opinion…We should lead, 
not follow”. Other foreign policy officials at the State Department shared this opinion and told 
Cohen (1973, p.63) that they were hired to act in a way they thought was best, even if the 
public was strongly opposing it. This did not mean that State Department officials were not 
looking for public support, they just did not want the public to shape foreign policy (Cohen, 
1973, p.64). If the general public were to decide not to support foreign policy, State 
Department officials said they hoped to prevent the public from criticizing it (Cohen, 1973, 
p.64). Hence, Yarmolinsky and Cohen concluded that foreign policy officials do not care too 
much about the public opinion. However, in a survey about presidential decision-making and 
the public opinion, Beal and Hinckley (1984) came to a different conclusion. It seemed that 
there is a growing acceptance among government officials about the public opinion (Beal & 
Hinckley, 1984, p.74). Most foreign policy decision-makers were still convinced of the fact 
that the public lacks knowledge about foreign affairs (Powlick, 1991, p.617). According to 
State Department officials, the lack of knowledge led to a less sophisticated public opinion 
about foreign affairs, (Powlick, 1991, p.617). Despite this belief, Powlick (1991, p.618) stated 
that the foreign policy decision-makers are aware of their ability to educate the public, so the 
public opinion can become sophisticated and interested in foreign affairs. Therefore, most 
foreign policy decision-makers thought that the public opinion must be involved in foreign 
policy. Beliefs about including the public opinion in policy can derive from ideas that the 
public should be involved in policy from a moral standpoint or practical standpoint (Powlick, 
1991, p.625). The answer to the question whether it is important if the public is involved in 
foreign policy can be found in the sources foreign policy officials use to find the public 
opinion (Powlick, 1995, p.428). Government officials can trace the public opinion by asking 
“non-governmental elites”, like lobbyists (Powlick, 1995, p.428). Also, the public opinion can 
simply be traced by opinion polls from the mass public (Powlick, 1995, p.429).  
In sum, it can be concluded that many scholars still believe that foreign policy 
decision-makers depend on their own ideological beliefs when decisions are made. It seems to 
many scholars evident that decision-makers rely more on their own ideology. However, more 
studies provide evidence that the public opinion becomes increasingly important for foreign 
policy decision-makers. Therefore, having reviewed the existing literature on belief systems, 
normative beliefs, and practical beliefs on the public opinion, the following proposition can be 
formulated. Even though previous work on belief systems proves that foreign policy decision-
makers still rely more on their normative beliefs than beliefs about the public opinion, it 
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seems that practical beliefs on the public opinion are becoming increasingly influential on 
foreign policy output. In this research project, it is tried to find evidence for this proposition.  
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Theoretical Framework 
In this section, the theoretical framework will be presented. First, a closer look will be taken 
at the concept of foreign policy decision-makers’ normative beliefs, and the indicators for the 
concept. Second, the concept of foreign policy decision-makers’ practical beliefs on the 
public opinion will be examined, together with its indicators. Lastly, a scheme will be 
presented, in which the concepts and indicators of normative beliefs and practical beliefs on 
the public opinion are contrasted.  
 
Normative Beliefs 
The first set of beliefs to be considered is that of normative beliefs. In this study, normative 
beliefs are defined as “the ideological beliefs of the foreign policy decision-makers”. Hence, 
these beliefs concern the values or ethical beliefs of the foreign policy decision-makers 
(Heywood, 2014, p.518). In this research project, normative beliefs are divided into two broad 
categories.  
 Firstly, normative beliefs that are part of the category of cooperative internationalism. 
In the literature review, foreign policy beliefs that are focused on multilateral plans were 
considered to be in line with cooperative internationalism (Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983, 
p.308). There are multiple features of cooperative internationalism that could function as 
indicators of normative beliefs. The first aspect of cooperative internationalism which could 
be an indicator for normative beliefs is economic liberalism. Statements that include 
references to free market economies that are left alone from the government, can be seen as 
indicators for economic liberalism (Heywood, 2014, p.93). The second aspect of cooperative 
internationalism that could be an indicator for normative beliefs is the active protection of 
human rights and democracy. Statements that include references about the protection of 
human rights and democracy are also seen indicators for normative beliefs. Together with 
economic liberalism, the promotion of human rights and democracy are part of the liberal 
values that are supported by the United States (Heywood, 2014, p.166).   
Secondly, normative beliefs that are part of the category of militant internationalism. 
In the literature review, foreign policy beliefs that included unilateral and military plans were 
considered to be in line with militant internationalism (Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983, p.308). 
Therefore, the image of American power can be seen as the central aspect of militant 
internationalism and the normative beliefs of American foreign policy decision-makers in 
general. Power is seen as “the ability to influence the outcome of events, in the sense of 
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having the ‘power to’ do something” (Heywood, 2014, p.217). American power is seen in the 
portrayal of American strength and the assumption that foreign policy should serve American 
interests in the first place. Hence, statements of foreign policy decision-makers that refer to 
American power, especially in a unilateral way, be indicative of normative beliefs.  
 
Practical Beliefs 
The second set of beliefs that ought to be studied in order to grasp the effects of belief 
systems is that of practical beliefs on the public opinion. Practical beliefs on the public 
opinion are here described as “the beliefs about the usefulness of the public opinion”. 
According to Foyle (1997, p.145), whether foreign policy decision-makers judge the public 
opinion to be useful relies on two aspects.  
Firstly, it depends on beliefs about the character of the public opinion. The way in 
which foreign policy decision-makers perceive the character and nature of the public opinion 
influences the extent to which they use it in the process of foreign policy making (Foyle, 
1997, p.145). If foreign policy decision-makers take a positive stance towards the public, and 
therefore the very nature of the public opinion, they will deem the public opinion as useful. 
However, if foreign policy decision-makers have a negative view on the public, and the 
opinion formed by the public, they will not see the public opinion as useful.   
Secondly, whether foreign policy decision-makers judge the public opinion to be 
useful depends on whether they see the public opinion as necessary for the successfulness of 
foreign policy (Foyle, 1997, p.145). If foreign policy decision-makers do not perceive support 
of the public as necessary for successful policy, they will not see the public opinion as useful. 
If foreign policy decision-makers deem the support of the public to be necessary for 
successful policy, they are likely to view it as useful. However, since it is not possible to 
measure this within the scope of this research project, the main focus will be on the character 
of the public opinion. In the next section, a brief overview of the literature on the character of 
the public opinion will be provided, in order to find indicators for this specific aspect of 
practical beliefs.  
 For a long time, the “Almond-Lippmann consensus” was seen as the norm for research 
about the character of the public opinion (Holsti, 1992, p.422). According to the “Almond-
Lippmann” consensus, foreign affairs were too complex to understand for the public, because 
the public was focused on its own environment and living standards (Lippmann, 1922, p.258). 
The public opinion was seen as unstable and intellectually unstructured (Almond, 1950, p.69). 
Since the work of Almond and Lippmann, many scholars disagreed with the statements made 
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about the public opinion. William Caspary (1970, p.536) challenged the assumptions of 
Almond by testing the so-called “mood theory” on actual data. Whereas Almond (1950, p.69) 
assumed that the public opinion was unstable, especially in times of crises, Caspary (1970, 
p.546) argued that the public opinion is actually quite the opposite - strong and stable. 
Caspary’s findings were partly in line with research done by other public opinion scholars. 
However, Risse-Kappen (1991, p.479) took a different approach. He looked at the 
relationship between public opinion and foreign policy decision-making in different liberal 
democracies. Just like other scholars, Risse-Kappen (1991, p.511) found out that the public 
opinion about foreign policy is stable, but this is partly the result of domestic structures. 
Societal cleavages can damage consensus about foreign policy issues (Risse-Kappen, 1991, 
p.511). Hence, many scholars started to agree more on the assumption of the public opinion 
being stable and structured. Bruce Russett (1990, p.95) also agreed on the public opinion 
being stable, but he made another important statement. Lippmann already stated that the 
American public is not capable of forming a well-structured opinion about international 
issues. Russett (1990, p.89) did not agree on this statement, he argued that the American 
public was simply less invested in foreign issues. Even though the American public might not 
be able to have an informed opinion about foreign affairs, according to Russett (1990, p.89) 
they just care less about events abroad if it is not considered as a crisis. Graham (1990, p.3) 
confirmed the findings about the awareness of the American public for crises situations and 
military issues. By examining hundreds of surveys about the public opinion and nuclear 
issues, Graham (1990, p.3) concluded that the American public was more attentive to military 
issues, and capable of forming a more informed opinion about military issues than about other 
issues. According to Aldrich et al. (2006, p.483), the public is increasingly interested in 
economic issues that are part of foreign policy. The public is getting more capable of forming 
a coherent attitude toward trade and globalization issues, if Aldrich et al. (2006, p.483) were 
to be followed. Hence, many scholars agreed on the public showing increasingly more interest 
in foreign affairs, not having more sufficient knowledge about international affairs (Page & 
Shapiro, 1992, p.14). The American public is able to form a rational opinion about politics, 
but Page and Shapiro (1992, p.15) concluded that most Americans still do not possess more 
sufficient information about international affairs. In the next section, indicators for practical 
beliefs on the public opinion will be derived from the literature that was reviewed in this 
section.   
 After examining the existing literature on the nature of the public opinion, indicators 
for the practical beliefs on the public opinion can be found. However, since measuring 
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specific beliefs can be difficult without asking someone specifically about his or her belief, 
statements that give an indication about the nature of the public opinion will be seen as 
indicator. Three indicators about the nature of the public opinion will be used in this research 
project. Firstly, the public’s understanding of foreign affairs. In speeches and statements, 
foreign policy decision-makers can refer to the public’s understanding of foreign affairs. 
Secondly, the emotional mood of the public. This refers to the nature of the public opinion, 
whether it is formed because of emotional moods, or from a rational standpoint. Thirdly, the 
public’s interest in or awareness of foreign affairs. Foreign policy decision-makers can make 
references about the way the public is aware of and interested in international events and 
foreign policy options.    
 
Figure 1. Beliefs and its indicators   
Foreign Policy Decision-Makers’ Beliefs 
Normative beliefs Practical beliefs on public opinion 
Indicators: Indicators: 
1. Statements about American power 1. Statements about the public’s 
understanding of foreign affairs 
2. Statements about economic liberalism 2. Statements about the emotional mood of 
the public 
3. Statements about the protection of 
human rights and democracy 
3. Statements about the public’s interest in 
and awareness of foreign affairs  
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Research method 
In order to find an answer to the research question, ‘what aspects of foreign policy decision-
makers’ beliefs influence foreign policy?’, a single qualitative case study has been conducted. 
By conducting a case study, insight was pursued in establishing whether the following 
proposition is to be taken as a falsehood or a truth: practical beliefs on the public opinion are 
becoming increasingly influential on foreign policy. This section is to do with the 
methodology, case selection, and data selection of the research project. 
 
Methodology 
The research method of this study requires further explanation. First, a qualitative research 
method was chosen, because it allows for the opportunity to collect in-depth information 
about the beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers. A quantitative research method would 
cause obstructions if beliefs have to be deducted and measured from sources such as speeches. 
A discourse analysis has been conducted in order to give insights in whether the proposition 
can be described as true or false. Forms of communication have been analyzed in order to 
trace the beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers in their speeches. A discourse analysis is 
the most appropriate research method because it gives the opportunity of finding observable 
data about foreign policy decision-makers’ normative and practical beliefs, without asking the 
decision-makers questions in person about their beliefs. The beliefs have been traced by 
utilizing the indicators previously presented in the theoretical framework section. In this way, 
the discourse of American foreign policy decision-makers in the United Nations General 
Assembly and Security Council has been analyzed in order to track their normative beliefs 
and practical beliefs on the public opinion.  
 
Case Selection 
In order to test whether the proposition can be seen as true or false, it was decided to find a 
least likely case. Bryman (2012, p.67) associates the concept of ‘case’ with a specific 
location, community or organization. Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council, in which American foreign policy decision-makers gave speeches, between 
12 September 2001 and 11 September 2002 were chosen to be the case in this research 
project.  
 There are reasons why a least likely case was picked as to test the proposition. The 
situation in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council between 12 
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September 2001 and 11 September 2002 can be described as a crisis situation. Holsti (1976, 
p.18) laid out conditions under which foreign policy decision-makers rely on their own 
normative beliefs. The first conditions referred to non-routine and ambiguous situations in 
which standard procedures cannot be followed anymore (Holsti, 1976, p.18). The second 
condition focused on the foreign policy decision-maker. When they are at the top of the 
hierarchy, it is more likely that they rely on their own normative beliefs because they are not 
constrained by bureaucratic rules (Holsti, 1976, p.18). Thirdly, when there are multiple policy 
options available, which Holsti (1976, p.18) described as an “information overload”, foreign 
policy decision-makers tend to rely more on their own normative beliefs in order to make a 
decision.  
 Since the three conditions are evident in the case of American foreign policy decision-
makers in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council between 12 September 
2001 and 11 September 2002, it is the least likely that the American foreign policy decision-
makers rely on their practical beliefs on the public opinion. However, if foreign policy 
decision-makers rely on their practical beliefs in this particular case and there is evidence 
found for the presented proposition, it can be seen as an opportunity for further research. 
Therefore, the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, in which American 
foreign policy decision-makers gave speeches, between 12 September 2001 and 11 September 
2002 is picked as a least likely case in this research project.  
    
Data Selection 
The qualitative approach of a discourse analysis requires the analysis of forms of 
communication (Bryman, 2012, p.528). The forms of communication in this case, will be 
speeches given by American foreign policy decision-makers. In this study, transcripts from 
seventeen speeches of American foreign policy decision-makers, given at the United Nations 
General Assembly and Security Council, have been studied. The speeches were given at the 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council between 12 September 2001 and 11 
September 2002. The speeches were selected for the discourse analysis, because the meetings, 
in which the speeches were given, included agenda items about international security issues. 
The international security issues ranged from measures against terrorism and the war on 
terrorism in Afghanistan to international drug control and humanitarian assistance.    
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Discourse Analysis 
I. Scheme 
The results of the discourse analysis are to be found in the following scheme. In the left 
column, information can be found about the speeches that were analyzed. The name of the 
foreign policy decision-maker, the date of the speech, location, and the agenda item are 
mentioned. The middle column is focused on the normative beliefs, whereas the right column 
on the practical beliefs on the public opinion. The middle and right column both have the 
same structure. Each column consists parts of foreign policy decision-makers’ speeches that 
represent either normative beliefs or practical beliefs on the public opinion. Then, under each 
statement that includes a normative or practical belief, a short explanation about the statement 
is given. The statements that include normative and practical beliefs are written in Italics, 
whereas the explanations are written in normal letters. 
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Speech 
 
Normative beliefs Practical beliefs 
 
1.Transcript of James B. 
Cunningham’s speech in the 
United Nations General 
Assembly on September 12, 
2001. Agenda item: 
Condemnation of terrorist 
attacks in the United States of 
America.  
 
 
“Yesterday’s attack requires that 
we choose sides between the 
values of human rights and 
democracy, held dear by all 
decent people, and terrorism and 
the law of the jungle. There are 
those who oppose terrorism and 
those who use it. There should be 
no doubt that we will deal with 
those who support and harbour 
terrorists as we deal with the 
terrorists themselves.” 
 
In this quote, Cunningham made 
clear how there are just two sides 
to choose from: a democratic and 
liberal side, and the side which 
oppose democratic and liberal 
values. In this way, he promotes 
the democratic and liberal values 
by letting countries choose a side.   
 
 
“Obviously, the hearts of all 
Americans are heavy today.” 
 
The day after the terrorist attacks, 
the United States ambassador to 
the United Nations emphasized the 
emotional mood of the American 
people.  
 
2.Transcript of Cameron 
Hume’s speech in the United 
Nations General Assembly on 
September 24, 2001. Agenda 
item: Report of the Secretary-
General on the work of the 
Organization. 
 
“This is a crucial moment for the 
United Nations. It has a chance to 
live up to the ideals on which it 
was founded.” 
 
Here, Cameron Hume emphasized 
the role of the United Nations to 
secure peace and prosperity in 
the world, including democracy 
and human rights.   
 
“Americans also realize that 
people from dozens of other 
countries lost their lives in those 
attacks. This tragedy is truly 
global in scope, and so must be 
the response. The people of the 
United States also stand with 
those of you who are grieving for 
your own.” 
 
Cameron Hume, Advisor on 
Human Rights at the United States 
mission to the United Nations, 
stated that the American people 
realized the global impact of the 
terrorist attacks. This can be 
seen as a statement about the 
public’s capability to understand 
international affairs.   
 
3.Transcript of John B. 
Negroponte’s speech in the 
United Nations General 
Assembly on October 1, 2001. 
Agenda item: Measures to 
eliminate international 
terrorism. 
 
“This session of the General 
Assembly, as members all know, 
was meant to implement the 
Millennium Declaration, issued 
one year ago this month. In it, we 
declared certain fundamental 
values to be essential to 
international relations in the 
twenty-first century: freedom, 
equality, solidarity, tolerance, 
respect for nature and shared 
responsibility.” 
 
“Scores of nations lost their 
citizens, their brothers and sisters, 
their parents and their children. 
Our deepest sympathies go to all 
of them. And let me say that the 
offers of support we have received 
in return — specially trained 
Asian firefighters, European burn 
teams, Latin American urban 
rescuers, Arab physicians and 
African trauma managers — have 
touched the people of the United 
States deeply.” 
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 John B. Negroponte, Deputy 
United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations, started off his 
speech by contrasting the terrorist 
acts with the essential liberal 
values, as stated in the 
Millennium Declaration.  
 
“Yes, resolution 1373 (2001) will 
impose on all of us the highest 
standards of vigilance, but 
vigilance is the price of freedom. 
And freedom, the first value of the 
new millennium, is worth the price 
of vigilance and more.”   
 
In this part of Negroponte’s 
speech, he argued that the liberal 
value of freedom is worth taking 
every necessary measure. This 
can be seen as a sign of American 
power.  
 
“We cannot let them act together; 
we cannot let them act alone; we 
cannot let them act at all.” 
 
“President Bush has made our 
policy clear: “We will direct every 
resource at our command — every 
means of diplomacy, every tool of 
intelligence, every instrument of 
law enforcement, every financial 
influence, and every necessary 
weapon of war — to the 
disruption and to the defeat of the 
global terror network.”” 
 
Negroponte strongly emphasized 
that the terrorists who committed 
the attacks will be stopped and 
punished. This is in line with the 
American ideology, which stated 
that American foreign policy 
should portray American power 
and strength.    
 
 
John B. Negroponte referred to the 
capability to understand 
international affairs, as well as 
the emotional mood of the 
American public. The American 
people understood how the 
international community provided 
assistance after the United States 
was attacked by terrorists. At the 
same time, the American public 
was touched by how much support 
they received from all over the 
world.  
 
4.Transcript of James Mack’s 
speech in the United Nations 
General Assembly on October 
12, 2001. Agenda item: 
International drug control. 
 
“As the rule of law itself had come 
under attack on 11 September, the 
emphasis must be placed on 
compliance with international law 
and judicial cooperation. There 
must be no compromise with 
criminal organizations, which 
lacked respect for democracy and 
the dignity of human life.” 
 
 
“…his country appreciated the 
support and solidarity it had 
received from the international 
community since 11 September.” 
 
Here, James Mack pointed out the 
awareness of the American 
public for the international 
solidary after the terrorist attacks. 
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 Just like Negroponte, James Mack 
made a statement about how the 
United States will make no 
concessions to the terrorists. In 
this way, Mack portrayed 
American strength in the United 
Nations.  
 
“There must be no compromise 
with criminal organizations, which 
lacked respect for democracy and 
the dignity of human life.” 
 
In the same part of the speech, 
Mack addressed human rights 
and democracy values. Besides 
this, Mack also referred to 
protection of these rights and 
values in the same statement.    
 
 
5.Transcript of Michael 
Rosenthal’s speech in the United 
Nations General Assembly on 
October 22, 2001. Agenda item: 
Report of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
 
“Although they were intended to 
make us cower and to intimidate 
us, those acts of terror have only 
strengthened our resolve to 
counter the evil of terrorism 
wherever it appears.” 
 
Michael Rosenthal, Department of 
State’s Director of the Office of 
Multilateral Nuclear Affairs, 
pointed out the American 
strength in the world. 
 
 
6.Transcript of James B. 
Cunningham’s speech in the 
United Nations General 
Assembly on October 30, 2001. 
Agenda item: United Nations 
Year of Dialogue among 
Civilizations 
“The United States is committed 
to the effort to strengthen the 
Security Council. Enlarging the 
Council is a means to that end, 
not the end in itself. A reformed 
Council, with Japan and Germany 
assuming permanent seats, and 
with an expanded number of 
rotating seats, would better enable 
the Council to exercise its primary 
responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security 
under the Charter.” 
 
The United States will lose 
relative strength if the council get 
enlarged. Therefore, by stating 
that the enlargement of the 
Security Council is not an end in 
itself, but a means to an end, 
Cunningham emphasized that the 
United States will not support 
enlargement no matter what.  
 
 
 
20 
 
7.Transcript of John B. 
Negroponte’s speech in the 
United Nations General 
Assembly on November 9, 2001. 
Agenda item: United Nations 
Year of Dialogue among 
Civilizations. 
“While we may be sure that the 
perpetrators of 11 September will 
receive justice; questions 
remain:” 
 
In this quote, Negroponte focused 
on the ideological aspect of 
portraying American strength, by 
saying that the United States will 
make no concessions to 
international terrorists. 
 
“The United States, of course, is a 
manifestation of Western 
civilization, with deep cultural 
roots in the ancient world of the 
Mediterranean, but it is much 
more than that.” 
 
Another ideological aspect is 
pointed out here: the promotion 
of democratic and liberal values. 
In the next sections of his speech, 
Negroponte explained how the 
United States exemplified cultural 
diversity and liberal values.  
 
“The Tehran Declaration of May 
1999, issued at the Islamic 
Symposium on Dialogue among 
Civilizations, stated among its 
general principles respect for the 
dignity and equality of all human 
beings; genuine acceptance of 
cultural diversity; and mutual 
respect and tolerance for the views 
and values of different cultures 
and civilizations.”      
 
In this quote, Cunningham 
referred to an important document 
that secured human rights. The 
protection of human rights is an 
important aspect of the American 
ideological beliefs.  
 
 
8.Transcript of President 
George W. Bush’s speech in the 
United Nations General 
Assembly on November 10, 
2001. Agenda item: Address by 
Mr. George W. Bush, President 
of the United States. 
 
“We are learning their names. We 
are coming to know their faces. 
There is no corner of the Earth  
distant or dark enough to protect 
them. However long it takes, their 
hour of justice will come.” 
 
President George W. Bush 
threatened the terrorists of 9/11 by 
saying that the United States were 
not going to make concessions. 
America’s great strength in the 
world is portrayed here again.   
 
“And the people of my country 
will remember those who have 
plotted against us.” 
 
President Bush made clear how 
the American people understand 
the goal of the war on terror.  
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 “We must press on with our 
agenda for peace and prosperity 
in every land. My country is 
pledged to encouraging 
development and expanding trade. 
 
In this quote, President Bush 
promoted the democratic and 
liberal values. Not just 
democratic values were pointed 
out, but also the values of 
economic liberalism  
 
“Finally, this struggle is a 
defining moment for the United 
Nations itself — and the world 
needs its principled leadership. It 
undermines the credibility of this 
great institution, for example, 
when the Commission on Human 
Rights offers seats to some of the 
world’s most persistent violators 
of human rights. The United 
Nations depends, above all, on its 
moral authority — and that 
authority must be preserved.”  
 
With strong leadership of the 
United Nations, Bush stated that 
the protection of human rights 
can improve in the difficult 
situation after the terrorist attacks 
of September 11.  
 
“Some nations want to play their 
part in the fight against terror but 
tell us they lack the means to 
enforce their laws and control 
their borders. We stand ready to 
help.” 
 
In this statement, President Bush 
portrayed American power and 
leadership in the world. 
Assistance in the war against 
terrorist was provided by the 
United States.  
 
  
“These obligations are urgent, 
and they are binding on every 
nation with a place in this Hall. 
Many governments are taking 
these obligations seriously, and 
my country appreciates it. Yet 
even beyond resolution 1373 
(2001), more is required — and 
more is expected — of our 
coalition against terror. We are 
asking for a comprehensive 
commitment to this fight.” 
 
By stating that the country 
appreciates other countries’ efforts 
in the war on terror, President 
Bush said how the American 
people are aware of the unfolding 
events in the fight against 
terrorism.   
 
“In this war of terror, each of us 
must answer for what we have 
done or what we have left undone. 
After tragedy, there is a time for 
sympathy and condolence. My 
country has been very grateful for 
both.” 
 
Here, President Bush made clear 
that the American public was 
aware of the solidarity among 
nations throughout the whole 
world.  
9.Transcript of Secretary of 
State Colin Powell’s speech in 
the United Nations Security 
Council on November 12, 2001. 
Agenda item: Threats to 
international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts.  
 
“The United States is taking the 
fight against terrorism directly to 
the terrorists and to their 
supporters. We have declared war 
on all terrorist organizations with 
a global reach.” 
 
 
“The American people were 
heartened by worldwide solidarity 
after the attacks.” 
 
Colin Powell stated how the 
American public understood the 
solidarity among nations. 
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 Secretary of State Colin Powell 
portrayed the American power 
by declaring a full scale war on 
terrorism. No dialogue is possible 
between terrorists and the United 
States.   
 
“But the war on terrorism starts 
within each of our respective, 
sovereign borders. It will be 
fought with increased support for 
democracy programmes, judicial 
reform, conflict resolution, 
poverty alleviation, economic 
reform and health and education 
programmes. All of these together 
deny the reasons for terrorists to 
exist or to find safe havens within 
those borders.” 
 
After portraying the American 
strength in the world, Colin 
Powell described how democratic 
and liberal values can eliminate 
international terrorism.  
 
 
 
10.Transcript of Sichan Siv’s 
speech in the United Nations 
General Assembly on November 
26, 2001. Agenda item: 
Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian 
and disaster relief assistance of 
the United Nations, 
including special economic 
assistance 
 
“This effort should provide a 
positive vision for the future of 
Afghanistan. It must be linked to a 
broadbased government that 
represents and protects human 
Rights.” 
 
Sichan Siv, United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, 
emphasized how a representative 
democracy can bring prosperity to 
Afghanistan.  
 
“We encourage the Afghan 
diaspora to make an important 
economic contribution, as well.” 
 
Liberal economic values are 
represented in this statement, since 
Siv encourage Afghans to make a 
contribution to the global 
economy.  
 
 
 
11.Transcript of James B. 
Cunningham’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on January 18, 2002. Agenda 
item: Threats to international 
peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts. 
 
“The struggle against terror must 
be won if we are to make progress 
together in building the more 
prosperous, tolerant, secure and 
democratic world that the vast 
majority of the world’s people 
aspire to.” 
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 Cunningham made clear how 
spreading democratic values 
throughout the world can help the 
war on terrorism. 
 
“The United States offers a 
broad range of counter-terrorism 
assistance programmes in a 
number of areas. 
 
The leadership’s role in 
counter-terrorism programmes 
that comes forward in 
Cunningham’s quote, exemplifies 
American power in the world. 
 
 
12.Transcript of James B. 
Cunningham’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on March 26, 2002. Agenda item: 
The situation in Afghanistan.  
 
No normative or practical beliefs 
were measured. 
 
13. Transcript of James B. 
Cunningham’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on April 15, 2002. Agenda item: 
Threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist 
acts. 
 
No normative or practical beliefs 
were measured. 
 
14.Transcript of Richard S. 
Williamson’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on May 23, 2002. Agenda item: 
The situation in Afghanistan.  
 
“We know that true peace will be 
achieved only when we give the 
Afghan people the means to 
achieve their own aspirations. 
Peace will be achieved by 
helping Afghanistan develop its 
own stable government. Peace 
will be achieved by helping 
Afghanistan train and develop its 
own national army. And peace 
will be achieved through an 
education system for boys and 
girls that works.” 
 
Richard S. Williamson, United 
States Ambassador to the United 
Nations for Special Political 
Affairs, stated that liberal values 
and equality can help 
Afghanistan in achieving peace 
and stability. 
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 We are working hard in 
Afghanistan — we are 
clearing minefields, we are 
building roads, we are 
improving medical care — and we 
will work to help 
Afghanistan to develop an 
economy that can feed its 
people without feeding the world’s 
demand for drugs. 
 
Here, Williamson stated that the 
United States helps Afghanistan 
with changing its economy to a 
more liberal economy, without 
relying on drug trafficking.   
 
 
15.Transcript of John D. 
Negroponte’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on June 27, 2002. Agenda item: 
Threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist 
acts. 
 
No normative or practical beliefs 
were measured.  
 
16.Transcript John D. 
Negroponte’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on July 19, 2002. Agenda item: 
The situation in Afghanistan. 
 
 “The United States focus in 
Afghanistan has continued to be 
centred on the conduct of the war 
on terrorism. The roughly 8,000 
coalition troops in Afghanistan are 
focused on the destruction of the 
remnants of Al Qaeda.” 
 
At a Security Council meeting about 
Afghanistan, Negroponte made 
clear that the United States have no 
compassion with terrorists. No 
concessions are going to be made, 
only justice will solve the problem 
of terrorism. By making these 
statements, Negroponte portrayed 
the American strength.  
  
 
17.Transcript of Secretary of 
State Colin Powell’s speech in the 
United Nations Security Council 
on September 11, 2002. Agenda 
item: acts of international 
terrorism. 
“Coalition forces, led by the United 
States, have liberated the Afghan 
people from the dual tyranny of Al 
Qaeda terrorists and the Taliban.” 
 
One year after the terrorist attacks, 
Powell also emphasized the 
leadership role of the United 
States in fighting international 
terrorism. 
“Here in the United States, 11 
September is seared deeply into our 
national consciousness. The attacks 
on our soil drew us closer as a 
people. They also drew us 
closer to people of kindness and 
good will across the globe. We will 
never forget the outpouring of 
sympathy and solidarity we 
received from throughout the 
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 “It was clear that the terrorists 
did not just strike America. They 
attacked the values of the civilized 
world that are enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter. It was 
clear that terrorism is a threat to 
international peace and security; 
and it was clear that all the 
world’s nations had to take 
concerted action if this menace 
was to be eradicated once and for 
all.” 
 
Secretary of State Colin Powell 
once again stated that the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 was an 
attack on the fundamental values 
of the civilized world. Just as 
Negroponte stated in October 
2001, values like freedom, 
tolerance, and respect were 
attacked by these terrorist acts.  
 
international community. On 
behalf of President Bush and on 
behalf of the American people, I 
wish to express my country’s 
abiding gratitude to all those who 
reached out to us at our time of 
national trial.” 
 
One year after the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, Colin Powell 
stated that the American public is 
aware of the support the United 
States received throughout the 
world in the struggle against 
terrorism.  
 
“So, on behalf of President Bush 
and the American people, I 
solemnly recommit the United 
States to our common fight against 
terrorism. We join all other 
Members of the United Nations in 
the effort to build a world of 
peace, prosperity and freedom 
where terrorism cannot thrive.” 
 
Besides the awareness of the 
American public, Powell assumed 
that the American public is 
positive towards the continuation 
of the war on terrorism.  
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II. Results 
A discourse analysis was conducted in order to find evidence for the proposition that practical 
beliefs are becoming more influential on foreign policy output. The results of the discourse 
analysis will be discussed in the following sections. First, the results for the normative beliefs 
will be discussed. Then, the results for normative beliefs will be discussed by presenting two 
statements for each indicator. Thirdly, the results for practical beliefs on the public opinion 
will be discussed by presenting two statements for each indicator as well.    
 
Normative Beliefs 
The concept of normative beliefs was described as “the ideological beliefs of the foreign 
policy decision-makers”. In order to operationalize the concept of normative beliefs, three 
indicators were chosen: statements about the protection of human rights and democracy, 
economic liberalism, and American power. The three indicators for normative beliefs of 
foreign policy decision-makers led to the results as showed in the presented scheme. In the 
immediate aftermath, as well as in the months that followed, normative beliefs came forward 
in the speeches of foreign policy decision-makers that were given in the United Nations 
General Assembly or Security Council. In the following sections, two exemplifying 
statements for each indicator will be presented and discussed. 
 
Protection of Human Rights and Democracy     
One of the aspects that was considered to be an important part of American foreign policy 
decision-makers’ normative beliefs was the protection of human rights and democracy. This 
aspect was frequently noticed in the speeches of American foreign policy decision-makers in 
the months that followed the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. An example is a section 
from James B. Cunningham’s speech in the United Nations General Assembly on September 
12, 2001: 
 
Yesterday’s attack requires that we choose sides between the values of human rights 
and democracy, held dear by all decent people, and terrorism and the law of the jungle. 
There are those who oppose terrorism and those who use it. There should be no doubt 
that we will deal with those who support and harbour terrorists as we deal with the 
terrorists themselves (United Nations, 2001a, p.8). 
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Cunningham made a distinction between people who support the values of human rights and 
democracy, and people who do not support these values. The distinction between those people 
who do and those who do not support these values was often mentioned in the speeches of 
other foreign policy decision-makers that would follow. One month later, James Mack, who 
was the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement, emphasized this distinction and the protection of human rights and democracy 
as well:  
 
As the rule of law itself had come under attack on 11 September, the emphasis must be 
placed on compliance with international law and judicial cooperation. There must be 
no compromise with criminal organizations, which lacked respect for democracy and  
the dignity of human life (United Nations, 2001d, p.9). 
 
By making a sharp distinction between those who do and those who do not support human 
rights and democratic values, American foreign policy decision-makers promoted protection 
of these same rights and values. This is in line with the literature about belief systems, as 
discussed in the literature review. Sabatier and Hunter (1988, p.231) argued that one specific 
aspect of the belief systems of foreign policy decision-makers is important: causal 
perceptions. These core beliefs are formed in the childhood and early adulthood of foreign 
policy decision-makers, and it plays a role in the decisions-making process (Sabatier & 
Hunter, 1988, p.231). The causal perception that comes forward in these two quotes is about 
human rights and democracy. Foreign policy decision-maker’s belief that supporting the 
values of human rights and democracy leads to good governance and the end of terrorism. 
The values of human rights and democracy play an important role in the American history, so 
therefore it makes sense that the core causal perception about human rights and democratic 
values were measured in the speeches. Especially the causal perception about supporting these 
values, which would lead to the end of terrorism, was noticed in a quote that will be discussed 
in the next paragraph.   
 
Economic Liberalism 
Another aspect of the foreign policy decision-makers’ normative beliefs that was argued to be 
important is economic liberalism. Similar to the protection of human rights and democracy, 
economic liberalism was promoted in the speeches of foreign policy decision-makers in the 
months that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11. The first example of the promotion 
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of economic liberalism was found in the speech of President George Bush, given at the United 
Nations General Assembly on November 10, 2001:  
  
We must press on with our agenda for peace and prosperity in every land. My country 
is pledged to encouraging development and expanding trade (United Nations, 2001h, 
p.10). 
 
Whilst keeping the liberal economic values of free trade and interconnectedness in mind, 
President Bush stated that “development and expanding trade” would lead to peace in every 
land (United Nations, 2001h, p.10). This causal perception of Bush’s belief system was also 
shared by his Secretary of State, Colin Powell: 
 
But the war on terrorism starts within each of our respective, sovereign borders. It will 
be fought with increased support for democracy programmes, judicial reform, conflict 
resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education 
programmes. All of these together deny the reasons for terrorists to exist or to find safe 
havens within those borders (United Nations, 2001i, p.17).  
 
Just like President Bush, Secretary of State Powell also stated that terrorism will be defeated 
by improving economic and democratic situations in certain countries (United Nations, 2001i, 
p.17). According to the claim of Sabatier and Hunter (1988, p.231) about causal perceptions, 
the statement of Bush and Powell can be justified. If they were to be believed, helping these 
countries with their economic situation, which is in line with the cooperative internationalism-
aspect of the foreign policy decision-makers’ normative beliefs, can lead to the same 
economic successes as the United States had. The Americans became an economic 
superpower when they used the principle of free trade, so with this core causal perception in 
mind, it can be explained that the principle of economic liberalism plays a role in the belief 
systems and speeches of foreign policy decision-makers.  
 
American Power 
The last aspect that was argued to be an important indicator of foreign policy decision-
makers’ normative beliefs was American power. Statements that indicated the portrayal of 
American strength were often made in the year following the terrorist attacks of September 
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11. The first statement about American power was made by John D. Negroponte, the Deputy 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, two weeks after the attacks: 
 
We cannot let them act together; we cannot let them act alone; we cannot let them act 
at all (…) President Bush has made our policy clear: “We will direct every resource at 
our command — every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon 
of war — to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network” (United 
Nations, 2001c, p.8). 
 
The determination to defeat terrorism by using every tool available shows the importance of 
the rhetoric of strength. Since American foreign policy decision-makers mentioned so 
frequently how the United States was going to successfully fight terrorism, it seemed that the 
perception of American strength is strongly embedded into their normative beliefs. Colin 
Powell’s speech also supported this statement: 
  
The United States is taking the fight against terrorism directly to the terrorists and to 
their supporters. We have declared war on all terrorist organizations with a global 
reach (United Nations, 2001i, p.16). 
 
The aggressive language and the declaration of war against terrorism represents the image of 
American strength that American foreign policy decision-makers were trying to draw during 
their speeches. This strategy matches with the militant internationalism, that is part of the 
foreign policy decision-makers’ normative beliefs. Militant internationalism refers to the 
willingness of using military forces for foreign policy goals (Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983, 
p.308). The willingness and determination to use these forces in the fight against terrorism 
was expressed in many speeches in the year after the terrorist attacks. The first statement 
discussed in this section is a good example of this determination, since Negroponte said that 
the United States is willing to use “every necessary weapon of war” in order to win the war on 
terrorism (United Nations, 2001c, p.8). Hence, by looking at the speeches of American 
foreign policy decision-makers, it seems that the portrayal of American power can be 
considered to be an important aspect of the normative beliefs. 
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Practical Beliefs  
The concept of practical beliefs on the public opinion was described as “the beliefs about the 
usefulness of the public opinion”. Three indicators were chosen in order to operationalize the 
concept of practical beliefs on the public opinion: statements about the public’s understanding 
of foreign affairs, the emotional mood of the public, and the public’s interest and awareness of 
foreign affairs. Only in the first two months after the terrorist attacks on September 12, and 
during Colin Powell’s speech a year after the terrorist attacks, practical beliefs on the public 
opinion were noticed in the speeches of foreign policy decision-makers. In the following 
sections, two exemplifying statement for each of the indicators for practical beliefs will be 
presented and discussed.  
 
Public’s Understanding of Foreign Affairs 
One of the aspects that was used to indicate practical beliefs on the public opinion was the 
public’s understanding of foreign affairs. During the period of 12 September 2001 until 11 
September 2002, statements about the public’s understanding of foreign affairs were put 
forward a few times. An example was found two weeks after the terrorist attacks, when 
Cameron Hume gave a speech at the United Nations General Assembly: 
  
Americans also realize that people from dozens of other countries lost their lives in 
those attacks. This tragedy is truly global in scope, and so must be the response. The 
people of the United States also stand with those of you who are grieving for your own 
(United Nations, 2001b, p.6). 
 
Hume clearly stated that the American public understood the global impact of a domestic 
terrorist attack (United Nations, 2001b, p.6). People from many countries did not survive the 
attacks in New York City, Washington D.C., and Virginia. However, the American public did 
not just understand that they were not the only country that suffered from the terrorist attacks, 
they also understood what had to be the next step in American foreign policy. This was 
addressed by Colin Powell, one year after September 11, 2001:  
 
So, on behalf of President Bush and the American people, I solemnly recommit the 
United States to our common fight against terrorism. We join all other Members of the 
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United Nations in the effort to build a world of peace, prosperity and freedom where 
terrorism cannot thrive (United Nations, 2002g, p.4). 
 
Powell mentioned the public’s understanding of foreign affairs by confirming its dedication to 
the war on terrorism (United Nations, 2002g, p.4). It did not become clear in his speech 
whether Powell implies or knows that the public wants to continue the war on terror. 
However, the fact that Powell included a statement about the public’s understanding about a 
foreign policy goal, which is defeating terrorism, can be a confirmation for the trend among 
American foreign policy decision-makers that the public should be involved in foreign policy 
(Powlick, 1991, p.625).  
 
Emotional Mood of the Public 
Another aspect that can indicate the foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs on the usefulness 
of the public opinion are statements about the emotional mood of the public. It can give an 
indication about the usefulness of public opinion, when American foreign policy decision-
makers have beliefs about the emotional mood of the public (Almond, 1950, p.69; Cohen, 
1973, p.62). After the United States was hit by terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the 
American public was seen as highly emotional. This was mentioned by American foreign 
policy decision-makers in the speeches they gave at the United Nations: 
  
Obviously, the hearts of all Americans are heavy today (United Nations, 2001a, p.8). 
 
The day after different planes flew into New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 
Washington D.C., James B. Cunningham emphasized that the American public was touched 
by the events (United Nations, 2001a, p.8). The emotional mood of the public was addressed 
by John D. Negroponte as well, when he gave a speech at the United General Assembly two 
weeks later: 
  
Scores of nations lost their citizens, their brothers and sisters, their parents and their 
children. Our deepest sympathies go to all of them. And let me say that the offers of 
support we have received in return — specially trained Asian firefighters, European 
burn teams, Latin American urban rescuers, Arab physicians and African trauma 
managers — have touched the people of the United States deeply (United Nations, 
2001c, p.8). 
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In recent studies, scholars suggested that the public is seen as less emotional and unstable, and 
therefore more rational in forming an opinion about foreign affairs (Russett, 1990, p.95; Page 
& Shapiro, 1992, p.15). Together with a growing acceptance among government officials 
about public opinion, American foreign policy decision-makers were expected to be more 
positive towards including the public opinion into foreign policy (Beal & Hinckley, 1984, 
p.74). Since American foreign policy decision-makers focused many times on the emotional 
mood of the public after September 11, it cannot be confirmed that there is still a positive 
attitude towards the public opinion. However, it can give an indication about the usefulness of 
the public opinion, which is according to these speeches less positive than recent studies 
suggest.      
 
Public’s Interest in and Awareness of Foreign Affairs 
The last aspect that was seen as an indicator for practical beliefs on the public opinion are 
statement about the public’s interest in and awareness of foreign affairs. In the past, scholars 
were skeptical about the American public caring about events outside the United States 
(Lippmann, 1922; Lipmann, 1927; Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955). This made foreign 
policy decision-makers less positive about the usefulness of the public opinion for foreign 
policy. However, recent studies have proven that the American public is more interested and 
aware of foreign affairs (Graham, 1990, p.3; Aldrich et al., 2006, p.483). In the months that 
followed after September 11, when giving speeches American foreign policy decision-makers 
often focused on the public’s attentiveness towards foreign affairs: 
  
These obligations are urgent, and they are binding on every nation with a place in this 
Hall. Many governments are taking these obligations seriously, and my country 
appreciates it. Yet even beyond resolution 1373 (2001), more is required — and more 
is expected — of our coalition against terror. We are asking for a comprehensive 
commitment to this fight. (United Nations, 2001h, p.9). 
 
President Bush stated that the American public appreciated the efforts of other countries to 
fight terrorism (United Nations, 2001h, p.9). By making this claim, President Bush gave the 
indication that the American public is aware of what is happening in the war on terrorism. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell made the same statement one year after September 11:  
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Here in the United States, 11 September is seared deeply into our national 
consciousness. The attacks on our soil drew us closer as a people. They also drew us 
closer to people of kindness and good will across the globe. We will never forget the 
outpouring of sympathy and solidarity we received from throughout the international 
community. On behalf of President Bush and on behalf of the American people, I wish 
to express my country’s abiding gratitude to all those who reached out to us at our 
time of national trial (United Nations, 2002g, p.3).  
 
Secretary of State Powell expressed how much the help in the war on terrorism is appreciated 
by the American people (United Nations, 2002g, p.3). By saying this, Powell gave the 
indication that the American public is aware of foreign affairs, at least aware of the war on 
terrorism. According to the existing literature, awareness and interest in foreign affairs could 
mean that American foreign policy decision-makers think more positively about the 
usefulness of the public opinion for foreign policy (Powlick, 1991, p.617). Hence, the three 
indicators for practical beliefs on the public opinion do not explicitly make clear if foreign 
policy decision-makers see the public opinion as useful for foreign policy.  
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Conclusions  
In the final section of this research project, a brief conclusion and discussion are presented. 
First, together with the results of the discourse analysis, an answer to the research question 
will be formulated. Secondly, the results of this research project are going to be generalized in 
the light of previous work. Thirdly, the research design of this project and its limitations will 
be analyzed and discussed. Lastly, a discussion will be started in order to give suggestions for 
further research.  
 
Results 
The following research question was used for this study: ‘what aspects of foreign policy 
decision-makers’ beliefs influence foreign policy output?’. It was tried to find evidence for the 
proposition that practical beliefs on the public opinion are becoming increasingly influential 
on foreign policy. However, the results of the discourse analysis did not provide sufficient 
evidence for this proposition. The year after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, core 
normative beliefs of the American foreign policy decision-makers were put forward more 
frequently than their practical beliefs on the public opinion. Whereas the American foreign 
policy decision-makers expressed their normative beliefs in their speeches throughout the 
entire year after the terrorist attacks. Practical beliefs on the public opinion were only to be 
recognized in the speeches of American foreign policy decision-makers with two months after 
the terrorist attacks, and one year after 11 September during a memorial speech. An answer to 
the research question, ‘what aspects of foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs influence 
foreign policy output?’, can be derived from these results. Within the situation that was 
described as a crisis situation, the normative beliefs of American foreign policy decision-
makers were more influential on foreign policy output than practical beliefs on the public 
opinion.  
 
Generalization of the Results 
How do the results of this research project contribute to the existing knowledge about foreign 
policy decision-makers’ beliefs? Previous work revealed that ideological beliefs play a large 
role in the belief systems. Public opinion scholars also revealed that decision-makers are 
starting to rely more on the public opinion when foreign policy is made. In this research 
project, no sufficient evidence was found to support this proposition. However, even though 
the existing literature proved that decision-makers rely mostly on their ideological beliefs in 
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difficult situations, this study revealed that practical beliefs on the public opinion come 
forward more often in crisis situations than in other situations. This can be seen as a stepping 
stone for further research, and a contribution to the existing knowledge about the belief 
systems of foreign policy decision-makers.   
 
Reflection 
A reflection on the research project leads to the discovery of certain limitations of the research 
design. First, a distinction between foreign policy decision-makers’ normative beliefs and 
their beliefs on whether they should use the public opinion was to be made. The concept of 
practical beliefs on the public opinion was defined as ‘beliefs on the usefulness of the public 
opinion’. However, it is possible that foreign policy decision-makers judge the public opinion 
to be useful for foreign policy, but still not use the public opinion in the decision-making 
process. Foreign policy decision-makers can have a certain belief about the public opinion, 
but it is possible that they make decisions which are not in line with these beliefs. Hence, the 
concept of practical beliefs on the public opinion does not give a real indication about the 
relationship between beliefs on the public opinion and the influence of these beliefs on 
foreign policy output.  
 In the previous section, it already became clear that operationalizing the concept of 
practical beliefs on the public opinion is difficult. Two indicators used to operationalize the 
concept of practical beliefs on the public opinion can be described as the second limitation of 
the research design. Besides the other indicator, statements about the public’s understanding 
of foreign affairs and statements about the public’s interest in and awareness of foreign affairs 
were used. Reflecting on the two indicators leads to the conclusion that it is difficult to see the 
difference between the two indicators.  
 The third limitation relates to the case study design. In this research project, it was 
tried to give insights in the beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers, and find evidence for 
the proposition that practical beliefs are becoming increasingly influential. A least likely case 
was chosen for this purpose. However, a longitudinal case would have been to better, because 
the measurement of practical beliefs can be compared with past measurements. In that way, it 
is possible to confirm whether practical beliefs are becoming more influential.  
 
Discussion 
The results of this research project can be used as stepping stones for further research. This 
study revealed, just as previous work, that foreign policy decision-makers rely mostly on their 
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normative beliefs when foreign policy is made. However, practical beliefs were only 
frequently noticed in their speeches within a specific time frame: the two months after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11. Therefore, further research could focus on whether practical 
beliefs tend to play a larger role in crisis situations than in non-crisis situations. 
 Another suggestion for further research lies in the operationalization of beliefs on the 
public opinion. In this study, there were difficulties operationalizing the concept of practical 
beliefs on the public opinion. Further research on foreign policy decision-makers’ beliefs on 
the public opinion ought to find better ways to operationalize the concepts in order to conduct 
research on this topic without conducting interviews with the decision-makers.       
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